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I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase “freedom of conscience” is, of course, not to be found in 
the United States Constitution: the First Amendment says only that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 However, it seems probable that 
one, then-contemporary Protestant conception of freedom of conscience 
† For their kind and helpful comments on and discussion of earlier versions of 
this essay, I would like to thank my colleagues at Arizona State University, particularly
Professors David Kader, Peter de Marneffe, Jeffrie Murphy, and James Weinstein, as 
well as all of my fellow symposiasts and guests at the San Diego Law Review
Symposium, Freedom of Conscience: Stranger in a Secular Land, April 23–24, 2010, 
particularly my commentator Steven Smith. 
* Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State 
University. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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was presupposed in these two clauses. Evidence for this conjecture can
be found not only in the debate and proposals concerning the Bill of Rights
of the United States Constitution but also in the frequently more expansive
language of early state constitutions. The Constitution of Virginia, for 
example, states:
That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence; and, therefore, all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of
all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.2 
I take it that the phrase “equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, 
according to the dictates of conscience” glosses a conception of freedom 
of conscience that concerns, fundamentally and primarily, the freedom
to choose and exercise forms of divine worship.  This is essentially an 
individualistic, private freedom that is understood to entail the freedom 
to join with like-minded persons in the worship of God and the freedom
to refuse communion with—and, perhaps, compulsory subsidization
of—any ecclesial community and to refuse participation in any particular 
religious rite.  “Ecclesial community” here signifies the latitudinarian
Protestant account of “church” advanced by John Locke in his Epistola 
de Tolerantia: “a free society of men, joining together of their own 
accord for the public worship of God in such manner as they believe will
be acceptable to the Deity for the salvation of their souls.”3 
So I am inclined to think, insofar as the original intent surrounding the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses concerned the Church, or churches, 
that the amendment was concerned only indirectly with religious institutions 
and that this concern tacitly assumed one particular Protestant conception of
“church.”  The degree to which the First Amendment’s second Free
Exercise Clause was originally understood to mandate legal accommodation 
based on individual religious conscience is a matter of some dispute.  I
shall proceed to argue that, if legal accommodation based on free exercise 
rights is a viable concept, a case can be made for understanding such 
accommodation in terms of what I shall term an institutional-privilege
approach to the First Amendment’s religion clauses.  But, insofar as such an
approach is deemed inappropriate, the theoretically most coherent approach
is probably either a Scalia-like minimalist conception of free-exercise-
based religious accommodation or a reductive-eliminativist approach, 
 2. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
 3. JOHN LOCKE, EPISTOLA DE TOLERANTIA: A LETTER ON TOLERATION 71 
(Raymond Klibansky ed., J.W. Gough trans., Oxford Clarendon Press 1968) (1689) 
(footnote omitted). 
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such as that of James Nickel, according to which the legitimacy of any
religion-based rights would depend upon their being analyzed in terms
of or reduced to other basic constitutional rights. 
II. CONSCIENCE: THE THOMISTIC CONCEPTION
The Latin noun conscientia is derived from the verb conscio, which 
has the etymology of “to know (in common) with.”  Conscio is defined
by the Oxford Latin Dictionary (OLD) as “to have (a crime) on one’s 
conscience.”4 Conscientia’s most basic meaning is “[t]he holding of 
knowledge in common,” particularly “the fact of being privy to a crime, 
[or] complicity.”5  But it can also mean consciousness of something,
particularly “[t]he act of being aware of something one has done or is 
responsible for.”6  Finally, OLD gives a definition that looks rather like a 
common modern definition of conscience: “[a]n inward perception of 
the rectitude or otherwise of one’s actions, moral sense, conscience.”7 
Cicero sometimes uses the phrase animi conscientiam in something like 
the modern sense of “conscience”—or “guilty conscience”—noting in 
his De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum that conscience in this sense is not
especially difficult to suppress.8  In the Latin vulgate translation of the 
Christian scriptures, conscientia typically translates the Greek suneidêsis, as
in the famous passage from St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans describing 
an apparently innate natural or moral law: 
For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are
of the law; these having not the law are a law to themselves: Who shew the 
work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them, 
and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one 
another . . . .9 
Although there is not an absolute scholarly consensus, it seems that by 
about the twelfth century St. Jerome’s use of the Greek suneidêsis in his 
Commentary on Ezekiel had been corrupted to sunderesis in the glossa




 8. CICERO, DE FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM, 142–43 (H. Rackham trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1994) (c. 45 B.C.E.). 
9. Romans 2:14 (Douay-Rheims). 
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ordinaria, a running commentary on the Bible drawn primarily from 
Patristic sources.10  Hence developed the scholastic doctrine of synderesis. 
To shorten considerably a rather long and complicated story, Saint 
Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between synderesis and conscience 
(conscientia).  In brief, synderesis is “immediate apprehension of the first
practical moral principles of the natural law.”11  Synderesis is the 
“natural habit,” the act of which is the undemonstrated understanding 
and acceptance of the first principles of natural law—the first principles
of practical reasoning.  In Saint Thomas Aquinas’s own words,
[F]or probity to be possible in human actions, there must be some permanent
principle which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all human works are
examined, so that that permanent principle will resist all evil and assent to all
good.  This is synderesis, whose task it is to warn against evil and incline to 
good.  Therefore, we agree that there can be no error in it.12 
Insofar as Aquinas attributes to synderesis a capacity for inerrant moral
judgment, it is with respect to propositions so general as to be virtually 
tautologous: “[G]ood is to be pursued and done, and evil is to be 
avoided.”13  Aquinas observes: 
So, then, as to the notion of the last end, all agree in desiring the last end, since
all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is in this that the last end
consists, as stated above.  But as to the thing in which this notion is realized, all 
men are not agreed as to their last end, since some desire riches as their
consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else.  Thus to every taste 
the sweet is pleasant; but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to
others the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is
absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste
takes the most pleasure.  In like manner that good is most complete which the 
man with well-disposed affections desires for his last end.14 
Attaining “well-disposed affections” involves, inter alia, having
undergone the right kind of moral training.  For Aquinas, conscience 
(conscientia) “is nothing but the application of knowledge to some 
special act.”15 So, for Aquinas, the term conscience properly applies to a
10. See DOUGLAS KRIES, THE PROBLEM OF NATURAL LAW 7–19 (2007). 
11. Robert A. Greene, Instinct of Nature: Natural Law, Synderesis, and the Moral 
Sense, 58 J. HIST. IDEAS 173, 173 (1997); accord KRIES, supra note 10, at 3–25. 
 12. 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, Question Sixteen: Synderesis, in TRUTH 300, 310 (James 
V. McGlynn trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1953) (c. 1259). 
 13. 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, Question XCIV: Of the Natural Law, in  THE SUMMA
THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 220, 222 (Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province trans., Daniel J. Sullivan rev., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. 1952) (c. 1273). 
 14. 1 THOMAS AQUINAS, Question I: Of Man’s Last End, in THE SUMMA
THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 13, at 609, 614–15. 
 15. 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, Question Seventeen: Conscience, in TRUTH, supra note 
12, at 314, 323. 
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moral judgment about a particular act—“whether it is right or not.”16   A
judgment of conscience can be a decision to do something or not to do
something hic et nunc (here and now); or it can be a judgment whereby 
an “act, after it has taken place, is examined with reference to the habit 
of knowledge to see whether it was right or not.”17  Error of various
kinds can certainly infect conscience:
[A] mistake can occur in the judgment of higher reason, as happens when one 
judges something to be licit or illicit which is not, as heretics who believe that 
oaths are forbidden by God.  Therefore, mistakes occur in conscience because
of the error which existed in the higher part of reason.  Similarly, error can
occur in conscience because of error which exists in the lower part of reason, as
happens when one is mistaken about civil norms of what is just or unjust, good 
or bad.18  Error also occurs because conscience does not make a correct 
application to acts.  For, as in constructing speculative syllogisms one can
neglect the proper form of argumentation, and thus arrive at a false conclusion, 
so he can do the same in practical syllogisms, as has been said.19 
It is far from clear what freedom of conscience might mean in the
Thomistic sense of conscience.  A person is, of course, morally required
to follow the dictates of his or her conscience.  But that merely means
that one is obliged to act in conformity with one’s considered judgment
of what the morally correct thing to do is in a particular situation.  If 
one’s judgment is incorrect—and if one is morally culpable for its being 
incorrect—one sins both in following one’s conscience and in not following 
it. Hence, in the Catholic tradition of moral theology that gives particular 
weight to the authority of Saint Thomas, it is of signal importance to do
everything one can to form correctly one’s conscience.  In this regard,
the adage of learning sentire cum ecclesia—“to think with the Church”— 
becomes especially important.  Consequently, within the Thomistic
tradition, the most plausible sense one could give to the idea of freedom
of conscience would imply some sort of obligation not to attempt to
compel—by “force or violence,” to use the phrase of the Constitution of 
Virginia20—rational, mature persons to assent to (true) moral judgments
that they have not actually made or would not otherwise make. In its most
minimal form, this would amount to a prohibition against something like 
16. Id. at 318 (translating to the original Latin phrase “an sit rectus vel non rectus”).
17. Id. at 319. 
18. In the original Latin, “circa civiles rationes iusti vel iniusti, honesti vel non 
honesti.” 
19. Id. at 324. 
 20. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 16. 
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suborning perjury by force or violence.  However, with respect to most 
other forms of intentional human behavior, there seems to be little
theoretical room within the Thomistic tradition for the legal accommodation 
of conscience.  The very point of positive law is to regulate conduct in a 
community in circumstances where it is supposed that the “uncoordinated” 
judgments of practical rationality made by individual persons—also
known as dictates of conscience—do not in themselves provide sufficient
guidance.  To put the point another way, a dictate of conscience is a 
private, concrete judgment of practical reason, while a positive law is
public, general judgment of practical reason.  In the political sphere, the 
latter controls the former except in those cases in which, for whatever
reasons, the law, or its legislator, elects to remain silent. 
Of course, for it to have any relevance to the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise Clause, it seems that the phrase “freedom of conscience”
should have some peculiarly religious significance: it should apply to 
judgments or acts pertaining to religious observance and, perhaps, to 
(some) judgments and acts thought to be grounded in religious conviction.
Although it is not clear that Aquinas specifically recognizes a notion of
conscience that is specifically religious, as opposed to moral, it seems to
me that the preceding discussion would apply to any Thomistic conception 
of freedom of conscience, as limited to religious contexts.  It hardly
needs to be noted that for Aquinas religion should be of fundamental 
significance in any human life.  But I think that this obvious fact does 
not entail that the idea of religiously grounded conscientia has a separate
and fundamental place in his general account of conscience.
There is some irony in what I take to be the predicament of
contemporary defenders of the relevance of an individualistic conception 
of freedom of conscience to the Free Exercise Clause.  The predicament
is the following: there is no reason, from the perspective of many
contemporary champions of the rights of conscience, why conscience
should have a distinctively religious basis.  Thus, in the manner of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, a dictate of conscience becomes any (sincere and
deeply felt?) moral judgment on the part of an individual.  But, why then
should any sort of legal accommodation be accorded to conscience as 
such?  It is not the purpose of positive law, in those cases in which it is 
deemed necessary to have such law, to systematize and direct the
practical judgments of individual persons (also known as dictates of 
conscience)?
1080
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III. FREE EXERCISE AND RELIGIOUS (?) ACCOMMODATION
It is a historical conjecture the substantiation of which would require 
more effort than I am now capable of expending that a particularly
religious sense began to be attached to the noun conscience amidst the 
attempt to work out a modus vivendi among competing religious traditions 
that arose subsequent to the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth 
century. In Britain, the idea of a religious notion of liberty of conscience 
finds explicit expression in the Declaration of Breda, issued by Charles
II in 1660 in connection with the restoration of the Stuart monarchy:
And because the passion and uncharitableness of the times have produced
several opinions in religion, by which men are engaged in parties and
animosities against each other (which, when they shall hereafter unite in a
freedom of conversation, will be composed or better understood), we do declare 
a liberty to tender consciences, and that no man shall be disquieted or called in
question for differences of opinion in matter of religion, which do not disturb
the peace of the kingdom; and that we shall be ready to consent to such an Act
of Parliament, as, upon mature deliberation, shall be offered to us, for the full 
granting [of] that indulgence.21 
In continental Europe, the Treaty of Münster of October 1648, part of 
the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’ War, adopted the 
general policy that the official religion of certain geographical areas 
would be the religion of the rulers of those areas—“cuius regio eius 
religio”—but adopted a policy of limited accommodation—“toleration”— 
for the (Christian) religious minorities in a given area that gave such
minorities the right to practice in public their religion at certain times 
and in certain places, and to practice it at will in private.22 
There are two principal points that I wish to make about seventeenth-
century freedom of conscience: (1) it was largely limited, in terms of 
external and public behavior, to public worship and (2) its parameters 
were understood to be defined in terms of particular religious traditions 
or ecclesial communities that needed to be accommodated in order to
obtain a workable modus vivendi.  With respect to the Peace of Westphalia, 
the relevant traditions were Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed (Calvinist) 
Christianity.  The scope of the Declaration of Breda is less explicit.  But 
it is clear that the various Protestant sects that had arisen since the 
21. Declaration of Breda, Apr. 14, 1660, 12 Car. 2 (Eng.). 
22. See Treaty of Westphalia, Holy Roman Empire-Fr., art. XXVIII, Oct. 24, 
1648, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp. 
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Reformation were intended to be included; more controversial and less 
successful was the extension of its principles to Roman Catholicism.
With respect to contemporary interpretation of the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment, neither of the preceding two points holds.  The
Free Exercise Clause has been interpreted to implicate something more
than freedom of public religious worship—although how much more
remains a matter of legal dispute.  And the application of both the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses has been extended beyond membership 
in any religious tradition or ecclesial community included in some 
“approved list.” 
Representative of one common, contemporary conception of the 
concept of freedom of conscience, which is particularly relative to the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses, is the doctrine developed by Martha
C. Nussbaum in her recent book.23 Perhaps the most fundamental
element of Nussbaum’s doctrine, which is indicated in her subtitle, is 
that the point of the First Amendment’s religion clauses is to guarantee
not just liberty, but equality—equality of religious liberty and equality of 
the public “respect” to be accorded to the religious convictions of
individuals.  She goes so far as to claim that “both of the ‘religion clauses’ . . .
are centrally about equality.”24  In order for this claim to be at all 
plausible, Nussbaum—although she does not use this terminology— 
must implicitly appeal to a notion of “proportional equality,” such as 
Aristotle believed should characterize distributive justice.  An important
consequence is that a law or governmental policy may not, in fact, 
equally respect the religious consciences of all citizens even if it is 
applied in the same arithmetical or mechanical way to all citizens.  Citing a
New York State ruling of which she approves, People v. Philips, which 
exempted a Roman Catholic priest from testifying in court about what he
had been told in the confessional, Nussbaum argues that “what makes
[the] Roman Catholic confession special is its sacramental character and
the centrality of that sacrament to the religion.”25  That a Catholic priest 
is given this privilege, so Nussbaum argues, is not to favor him unfairly
or treat him “unequally” relative to any member of the Protestant clergy 
who is not given the same privilege of immunity—because the sacrament of
penance (confession) and “seal of the confessional” is not a part of 
Protestant doctrine—and hence it seems, the privilege would be of no 
use or value to the Protestant clergy.  Although Nussbaum recognizes a 
23. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). 
24. Id. at 16. 
25. Id. at 128–29. 
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sense of equality before the law—in effect, Aristotle’s “arithmetical
equality”—according to which all citizens would be compelled equally
to yield to such a law as that compelling testimony in court, she judges 
that the “understanding of equality . . . by the early anti-accommodationists
[with respect to the Free Exercise Clause] is harsh and in a sense
superficial, underrating the damage done to conscience by majority laws 
that place asymmetrical burdens on minorities.”26 
As this quotation indicates, another of Nussbaum’s tenets is that a 
fundamental purpose of the religion clauses is—or should be—to protect 
the religious consciences of minorities.  Her assumption appears to be 
that a religious majority generally can fend for itself in a democracy
because it will see to it that no law will be made or government policy 
adopted that will infringe on the consciences of its members.  It is not
clear, however, how her emphasis on religious accommodation of 
minorities squares with her emphasis on placing “asymmetrical burdens” on
consciences because consciences are by their nature things that belong to 
individuals.  I suppose that one might argue that there is no more of a 
“minority” in a society, particularly a pluralistic one, than the individual 
citizen—a “minority of one.”  However, the problem lurking here seems
substantial.  It is exacerbated by the tendency of Nussbaum—a tendency
that is by no means unique to her conception—to secularize the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses.
On the one hand, the Establishment Clause is sometimes interpreted to
prohibit favoritism not just toward particular religious traditions or 
ecclesial communities but toward “religiosity” or religion in some 
generic sense.27  This is indeed the interpretation favored by Nussbaum
herself: she rejects the “nonpreferentialism” favored by former Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, according to which “what the Establishment
Clause rules out is any preferential establishment of religion, that is, one 
preferring one sect or group of sects to others.”28  Nussbaum argues that 
the balance of historical evidence, despite some notable “aberrations,” 
favors interpreting the Establishment Clause as prohibiting favoritism to
religion “in general”—on the grounds that any such preferential treatment
26. Id. at 130. 
 27. The term favoritism would suggest the preference of religiosity to something 
else.  But what?  Is it atheism, agnosticism, or simply not caring about religious or 
theological matters? 
 28. NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 109. 
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would “create a hierarchy among citizens [with respect to the categories 
of religious, religiously agnostic, antireligious, or simply “not giving a
damn one way or the other,” I suppose], so that they do not all enter the 
polity on equal conditions.”29  Furthermore, despite her general approval
of the doctrine that “[u]nder our Constitution, religion is special,”30 she 
favors an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that would permit
some accommodations of conscience on grounds that are not religious in 
any traditional sense of the term.
The conceptual problem in Nussbaum’s position—as she is well
aware—is that its elements are at least in tension if not flatly inconsistent. 
How can religious accommodation, by its very nature, fail to favor some
religious traditions or ecclesial communities in such a way that does not 
conflict with the Establishment Clause, as she interprets it?  And, if 
certain accommodations are seen as mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause on religious grounds, how could one consistently prohibit the 
same or similar accommodations on grounds that are not religious.  But
if the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause mandates accommodations
that are not religiously grounded, the paradoxical result would seem to
be that this clause, guaranteeing free exercise of religion, is not essentially 
about religion at all.  So, contrary to Nussbaum’s stated conviction, it seems
not to be the case that “[u]nder our Constitution, religion is special.”31 
Nussbaum considers various ways of resolving or mitigating these 
problems.  She begins by considering, as she puts it, possible accounts 
“of what might be thought special about religion,”32 with the view that
“[i]f that or those characteristics are present in at least some secular 
commitments, perhaps accommodation should be cautiously extended to 
those cases.”33  She quickly—too quickly, I shall later argue—rules out 
the idea that what is pertinent in characterizing the scope of application
of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses is that “religion involves 
a group and some organized structure of authority.”34 Such an institutional 
account of religion, while it may originally have been the practical basis 
for much seventeenth-century religious toleration, would ill accord
with Nussbaum’s general emphasis on fundamental importance of
accommodation of the individual conscience and the phenomenon of
29. Id. at 111. 
30. Id. at 164. 
31. Id.
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“solitary seekers, affiliated with no official structure.”35 She then considers
the possibility that free exercise accommodation could be granted on the 
basis “that religion involves very strongly felt commitments, commitments 
central to a person’s life.”36 But this “subjective account of religion’s
specialness,” she opines, is both under- and over-inclusive.37  It might 
fail to apply to “cases of religious membership that are habitual and not
particularly emotional, or that involve religions based on ritual practice 
rather than strong feeling.”38 And it might apply to cases of deeply felt 
commitments that most of us would regard as inappropriate grounds for 
accommodation because of their triviality, from our perspective, or for
other reasons: 
Nobody wants to give a draft exemption to someone who is intensely attached
to his car, however sincere the attachment may be.  Nor—should I discover that 
my employer will not let me attend an afternoon White Sox game without
penalty—ought I to have grounds for litigation under the First Amendment 
when I am fired and denied unemployment compensation.39 
Ultimately, Nussbaum postulates an “idea of conscience” that she
associates particularly with the American colonial theologian and founder
of Rhode Island, Roger Williams.  Conscience is a: 
faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate meaning of life. . . .
The faculty is identified in part by what it does—it reasons, searches, and
experiences emotions of longing connected to that search—and in part by its 
subject matter—it deals with ultimate questions, questions of ultimate meaning. 
It is the faculty, not its goal, that is the basis of political respect, and thus we can 
agree to respect the faculty without prejudging the question whether there is a 
meaning to be found, or what it might be like.  From the respect we have for the 
person’s conscience, that faculty of inquiring and searching, it follows that we 
ought to respect the space required by any activity that has the general shape of
searching for the ultimate meaning of life, except when that search violates the





39. Id.  Perhaps Nussbaum is not here sufficiently sensitive to the religious
significance of the automobile.  This is a theme of Flannery O’Connor’s Wise Blood, in 
which the character Hazel Motes makes the pregnant observation, “[N]obody with a
good car needed to worry about anything.”  See FLANNERY O’CONNOR, WISE BLOOD 206
(Noonday Press 1991) (1949).  One also thinks of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, in 
which “Our [Henry] Ford” is the deity of the religion of “Fordism,” with its cosmic
optimism: “Ford’s in his flivver . . . .  All’s well with the world.” See  ALDOUS HUXLEY,
BRAVE NEW WORLD 31, 36 (1932). 
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may arrive at a political consensus concerning the need to respect human
faculties, without at all agreeing concerning the value of the specific activities
that these faculties perform.40 
Nussbaum’s conception of conscience as a faculty that “reasons, searches, 
and experiences emotions of longing” connected with “ultimate meaning” is
ingeniously designed to accomplish a great deal about which she evidently 
cares.  The equal possession of such a faculty forms the basis for a right 
of “equality of respect” that she would like to associate with the First
Amendment’s religion clauses.  Furthermore, as the basis of these clauses, 
this conception of conscience preserves the centrality of individual persons, 
as opposed to institutions, with respect to the constitutional conception 
of freedom of religion as freedom of conscience.  It also accommodates
a secularized understanding of freedom of conscience because the supposed
faculty of searching for ultimate meaning does not need to function 
within any religious tradition and does not presuppose a recognizably
religious basis—although it may, in fact, often function within such a 
religious context.41  Finally, since it is the faculty rather than any particular
behavioral manifestations of the faculty that is due “equal respect,” a sort
of messy selectivity in deciding what behavior warrants free exercise 
accommodation can be theoretically justified—a messy selectivity that
mirrors the actual development of First Amendment religion clause
jurisprudence. 
Nussbaum’s theory mirrors, in several respects, the twentieth-century 
development of this jurisprudence.  In particular, it mirrors one area in 
which the Court has attempted to secularize free exercise accommodation, 
while both maintaining a robust conception of nonestablishment and
retaining some notion of the constitutional “specialness” of religion: 
cases dealing with exemption from compulsory military service.  There 
has been a long-standing tradition of exempting from military service 
adherents to religious traditions in which commitments to pacifism are 
central.  “The Draft Act of 1917 afforded exemptions to conscientious 
objectors who were affiliated with a ‘well-recognized religious sect or
 40. NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 168–69. 
41. As a psychological matter, it seems to me rather implausible to suppose that 
there is a particular faculty the function of which is focused on—searching for, reasoning 
about, and experiencing—“ultimate meaning.”  Surely, not everyone actually cares
about such matters or recognizes the existence and importance of the idea of ultimate 
meaning.  And, among those who do, ultimate meaning is not always either a religious or
even a moral matter but can be, say, aesthetic.  Do we really want to grant, for example, 
an exemption to military service for someone who finds ultimate meaning in beauty and
objects to war simply because it is so ugly?  My thanks to my colleague Jeffrie G. 
Murphy for discussing this issue with me. 
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organization [then] organized and existing and whose existing creed or 
principles [forbade] its members to participate in war in any form . . . .’”42 
The 1940 Selective Training and Service Act made it “unnecessary to 
belong to a pacifist religious sect if the claimant’s own opposition to war
was based on ‘religious training and belief.’”43 According to Justice 
Clark’s review in United States v. Seeger: 
Between 1940 and 1948 two courts of appeals held that the phrase “religious
training and belief” did not include philosophical, social or political policy. 
Then in 1948 the Congress amended the language of the statute and declared 
that “religious training and belief” was to be defined as “an individual’s belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”44 
The problem in Seeger’s case was that, although he had been raised a 
Roman Catholic and had been a “close student of Quaker beliefs,”45 he 
was unprepared to assert the existence of a Supreme Being and, hence,
to found his conscientious objection on obligations owed to a deity in
any traditional sense of “deity.”  Rather, it was founded, in Seeger’s own 
words, on:
“[B]elief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a 
religious faith as a purely ethical creed.”  He cited such personages as Plato,
Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral 
integrity “without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.’”46 
Although it is clear that Seeger’s objections to war were essentially
ethical and fundamentally secular, those objections appear to retain what 
one might describe as a faint but distinctive odor of religiosity.  Faced
with the sizeable task of discounting Congress’s explicit refusal to
extend exemptions on the basis of “essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code,”47 Justice Clark, 
writing for the majority, focused on that odor.  He interpreted the statute’s 
phrase “religious training and belief” to connote:
42. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171 (1965) (alterations in original) 
(quoting The Draft Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 76). 
43. Id.
44. Id. at 172 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Berman v. United
States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), and United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 
1943)). 
45. Id. at 186. 
46. Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 172. 
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[A]ll sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a 
faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent.  The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful 
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the 
statutory definition.48 
On this basis, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the court of 
appeals “that the registrant demonstrated that his belief as to opposition 
to war was related to a Supreme Being.”49 
If United States v. Seeger seemed to stretch the language of a 
congressional statute past the breaking point—in the interest of
maintaining the statute’s constitutionality—the problem was exacerbated
in Welsh v. United States in which the petitioner had at one time 
characterized the basis of his pacifism as “nonreligious” and, at another, 
as “religious [only] in the ethical sense of the word.”50  Nonetheless,
Justice Black, writing for the majority, ruled in favor of the petitioner, 
noting that Welsh had mischaracterized his own views of the sense of
term religious that the court had adopted in Seeger to interpret the 
language of section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act.51  Consequently, according to Justice Black:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or
moral in source and content but that nevertheless impose upon him a duty of
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs
certainly occupy in the life of that individual “a place parallel to that filled 
by . . . God” in traditionally religious persons.  Because his beliefs function as a 
religion in his life, such an individual is as much entitled to a “religious”
conscientious objector exemption under § 6 (j) as is someone who derives his 
conscientious opposition to war from traditional religious convictions.52 
Justice Black still had to deal with the explicit exclusion in section 6(j) of 
persons whose pacifism is grounded in “essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”53  He opined: 
The two groups of registrants that obviously do fall within these exclusions 
from the exemption are those whose beliefs are not deeply held and those whose 
objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle 
but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.54 
48. Id. at 176. 
49. Id. at 187. 
50. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 340 (ellipsis in original).
53. See id. at 336. 
54. Id. at 342–43. 
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It is clear that the Court had found itself with an essentially subjective,
psychological criterion of religious exemption from military service:
persons who are entitled to exemption are those “whose consciences,
spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give 
them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an
instrument of war.”55  In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan objected to
this doctrine as an account of the congressional language and intent of
section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act.56 His 
view was that that clause was intended to limit exemption to those
professing total pacifism on the basis of some sort of theistic belief.57 
However, he believed that such a limitation violated the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause.58  Although holding that congressional elimination
of all exemptions for conscientious objectors “would be wholly ‘neutral’ 
and, in [his] view, would not offend the Free Exercise Clause,”59 he 
preferred an interpretation of the congressional exemption60 such that “it 
must encompass the class of individuals it purports to exclude, those
whose beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. 
The common denominator must be the intensity of moral conviction
with which a belief is held.”61 
These cases are, of course, largely cases dealing with statutory
interpretation and not directly with the First Amendment’s religion 
clauses.  However, concern about what the religion clauses permit and
demand obviously is one motivating factor in the Court’s reasoning.
The subjective and psychological approach that the Court appeared to 
adopt toward conscientious objection, if viewed as an issue of free 
exercise, obviously conjures visions of a very slippery slope.  Who can 
discern the point at which a “moral conviction” is not sufficiently 
“intense” to warrant free exercise protection, even within the limited
area of conscientious objection—and why should one want to ground
55. Id. at 344. 
56. See id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
57. See id. at 344–45. 
58. Id. at 356. 
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).  As my colleague Jeffrie Murphy has emphasized 
to me, convictions concerning “ultimate meaning,” as in Nussbaum’s theory and as in
Justice Scalia’s ridicule of the “sweet-mystery-of-life” rationale for privacy rights, are 
not necessarily to be equated with religious, moral, or ethical convictions.  See Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional rights in “intensity” of conviction anyway?  One way that
a slippery slope is sometimes avoided is by an abrupt, if not always
clearly principled, application of brakes.  And it appears that the Court
applied the brakes rather abruptly in some later, Vietnam War era
conscientious objection cases.  The petitioners in Gillette v. United
States, for example, sought exemption from military service on the 
grounds of moral objections to the Vietnam War, not to all wars in
general.62  Petitioner Gillette’s grounds were, in his own characterization, 
“based on a humanist approach to religion,”63 while petitioner Negre’s
moral objections were grounded in Roman Catholic just war theory.64 
Section 6(j), incorporated into the Military Service Act of 1967, was 
interpreted by the Court as limiting exemption, in the words of the Act,
to those “conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.”65 
Thus, the Court rejected each petitioner’s claim to “a nonconstitutional 
right to be relieved of the duty of military service in virtue of his
conscientious scruples.”66 
However, the Court also considered the contention of the petitioners 
that Congress’s restriction of exemption to conscientious objection to all
war violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause because it 
favors one sort of religious basis for exemption—conscientious objection 
based in total pacifism—over another—a selective basis of conscientious
objection such as just war theory.67  Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, admitted that the sincerity—or “intensity”—of the petitioners’ 
beliefs is not in question:
 Properly phrased, petitioners’ contention is that the special statutory status
accorded conscientious objection to all war, but not objection to a particular
war, works a de facto discrimination among religions.  This happens, say petitioners, 
because some religious faiths themselves distinguish between personal participation 
in “just” and in “unjust” wars, commending the former and forbidding the latter,
and therefore adherents of some religious faiths—and individuals whose 
personal beliefs of a religious nature include the distinction—cannot object to
all wars consistently with what is regarded as the true imperative of conscience
Of course, this contention of de facto religious discrimination, rendering § 6 (j) 
fatally underinclusive, cannot simply be brushed aside.68 
Although the constitutional contention is not exactly “brushed aside,” 
it is rejected by Justice Marshall.  He opines that there are sufficient
62. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439 (1971). 
63. Id.
64. See id. at 440–41. 
65. Id. at 441. 
66. Id. (footnote omitted).
67. See id. at 451. 
68. Id. at 451–52. 
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“neutral” reasons—the “hopelessness of converting a sincere conscientious 
objector into an effective fighting man”69—for the granting of a
religiously based exemption to military service in the case of complete
pacifism and, more to the point, that such “affirmative purposes”
underlying the congressional grant of exemption are neutral in the sense 
of the Establishment Clause: “‘[n]eutrality’ in matters of religion is not
inconsistent with ‘benevolence’ by way of exemption from onerous
duties so long as an exemption is tailored broadly enough that it reflects 
valid secular purposes.”70  Justice Marshall is concerned that “opposition 
to a particular war may more likely be political and nonconscientious, 
than otherwise”71 and that:
[T]he belief that a particular war at a particular time is unjust is by its nature
changeable and subject to nullification by changing events.  Since objection
may fasten on any of an enormous number of variables, the claim is ultimately 
subjective, depending on the claimant’s view of the facts in relation to his
judgment that a given factor or congeries of factors colors the character of the 
war as a whole.72 
Such concerns led to sympathy on his part with the “[g]overnment’s 
contention that a program of excusing objectors to particular wars may
be ‘impossible to conduct with any hope of reaching fair and consistent 
results.’”73 
But Justice Marshall also considered a deeper theoretical contention 
by the government: 
In addition to the interest in fairness, the Government contends that neutral,
secular reasons for the line drawn by § 6 (j)—between objection to all war and
objection to a particular war—may be found in the nature of the conscientious
claim that these petitioners assert.  Opposition to a particular war, states the 
Government’s brief, necessarily involves a judgment “that is political and
particular,” one “based on the same political, sociological and economic factors
that the government necessarily considered” in deciding to engage in a particular
conflict.  Taken in a narrower sense, these considerations do not justify the
distinction at issue, for however “political and particular” the judgment underlying
objection to a particular war, the objection still might be rooted in religion and 
conscience, and although the factors underlying that objection were considered
and rejected in the process of democratic decisionmaking, likewise the
viewpoint of an objector to all war was no doubt considered and “necessarily”
69. Id. at 453. 
70. Id. at 454. 
71. Id. at 455. 
72. Id. at 456. 
73. Id (citation omitted).
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rejected as well.  Nonetheless, it can be seen on a closer view that this line of
analysis, conjoined with concern for fairness, does support the statutory distinction.74 
The government’s brief recognized that one rather obvious issue is 
raised by one important strand in later twentieth-century First Amendment
jurisprudence: the particularization, subjectification, and secularization 
of the idea of “conscience”—as in “conscientious objection.”  If the
phrase “conscientious objection” can be properly applied to any individual
demurral from government policy that is sufficiently “serious” and if
that demurral has a recognizably moral basis—or, alternatively, a basis 
in strong and sincere convictions concerning the “meaning of life”—an
interpretation of free exercise could be developed that would be broad 
enough to excuse the individual person from compliance with the results 
of even the most “democratic decisionmaking.”  The result would be that
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause would become, in effect, a
constitutional guarantee of a subjective right to civil disobedience. 
There is perhaps some irony in the fact that the twentieth-century Supreme 
Court has taken steps—unwittingly, I assume—back toward something 
like the Thomistic conception of conscientia: an individual person’s 
private application of practical reason, in the form of a moral judgment
about some individual act in the totality of its particular circumstances.
As I previously mentioned, it is far from obvious that there should be 
any general constitutional right of the “free exercise” of a conscience, in
this sense, which happens to find itself in serious opposition to any
positive law or governmental policy.
If the First Amendment’s religion clauses are to continue to be 
interpreted as applying to the consciences of individual persons, it seems 
that a conception of conscience much more restricted than that of Aquinas
is needed.  Because of what many have believed to be the demands of 
the Establishment Clause, the traditional solution to the problem—the 
requirement of a strong belief grounded in a recognized religious
tradition—has generally not been regarded as acceptable.  Indeed, even 
relaxing or altering75 the requirement to that of a strong moral belief 
“based on religious training and belief” has proved insufficient to prevent 
concerns arising about the Establishment Clause’s relevance to legislation 
74. Id. at 458. 
75. The apparent assumption that the moral is an appropriate secular surrogate for
the religious is not at all obviously true.  Many religious persons—and traditions—would
certainly balk at the idea that the core or essence, so to speak, of religious conviction is 
its moral or ethical content.  Again, my thanks to my colleague Jeffrie Murphy for
discussion of this matter.
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seemingly favoring religiously based pacifism over nonreligiously based
pacifism.
Nussbaum’s theoretical solution invokes a perhaps novel account of
conscience as the faculty that “reasons, searches, and experiences
emotions of longing connected to that search . . . it deals with ultimate 
questions, questions of ultimate meaning.”76  However, it is not clear 
that this general characterization of a presumed human faculty gives any
indication of which of its manifestations should be protected, and which
should not be protected, under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause.  In his magisterial two-volume study of the First Amendment’s 
religious clause jurisprudence, our fellow symposiast Kent Greenawalt
mentions—en passant and in specific connection with conscientious 
objection to military service—that:
One fairly simple aspect of delimiting the boundary of “conscientious opposition”
is drawing the line between claims of moral duty and claims based on self-
interest.  A registrant who candidly states that fear or a desire for the easy life
rather than moral duty undergirds his opposition to participation obviously does
not qualify for an exemption.77 
As a piece of common sense, this judgment seems to me to be
unexceptionable.  But what of the registrant who claims that, after much
careful thought and study, he has wholeheartedly embraced some version of
the moral theory of egoistic ethical hedonism?  And, after further careful 
judgment, he has concluded, on the basis of his sincere, strong, ethical 
commitments, that his participation in military service would seriously
impair his prospects for his pleasure maximization and, hence, that it
would be immoral for him to comply with the requirement of military
service.  Of course, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely that such an
argument would be successful before many draft boards or courts.  But, 
on what subjective, secularized theory of conscientious objection could 
it be ruled out in more than a merely ad hoc manner? 
One assumption, I think, is attractive to both Nussbaum and Greenawalt,
despite their other theoretical differences: this is the assumption that we
should not expect a general theory of rights of conscience—if we are to
have one—to supply, in any algorithmic, systematic way, answers to all 
individual questions concerning matters of conscience.  Rather, “gently
 76. NUSSBAUM, supra note 23, at 169. 
 77. 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND 
FAIRNESS 66 (2006). 
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guided” by either a general theory (Nussbaum) or by the diverse values 
underlying the First Amendment’s religious clauses (Greenawalt), we 
should let discretion—including judicial discretion—decide the issue on
a case-by-case basis by appealing to some combination of common sense, 
judgment of the contemporary Zeitgeist, and precedent.  I do not think 
that this approach should be rejected out of hand.  In oral comments, my
fellow symposiast Andrew Koppelman and my colleague James Weinstein 
have both made the point that the Court’s approach in the twentieth 
century to cases involving conscientious objection need not indicate that
there are any great practical, legal problems with respect to First
Amendment religion clause jurisprudence in general.  It has been some
time since the country has had military conscription.  Thus, the Court 
has not been faced with draft exemption cases that would further “push
the envelope.”  And, it can plausibly be maintained, the rule of law has 
not been threatened by a rash of cases seeking exemption from other 
statutes on the basis of subjective free exercise claims. 
I certainly admit the force of these considerations.  Nonetheless, the 
subjective approach to freedom of conscience, which has become
increasingly implicated in the interpretation of free exercise, seems to me
to be conceptually problematic.  Consequently, in what follows I should
like to consider an alternative line of thought.  Because I am neither a 
“practical politician” nor a lawyer, let alone a legal scholar of constitutional 
law, I make no claims concerning either the political viability or the 
constitutional plausibility of the approach I consider. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RELIGION CLAUSES: INDIVIDUAL-
CONSCIENCE VERSUS INSTITUTIONAL-
PRIVILEGE INTERPRETATIONS
In the Catholic tradition, the phrase “freedom of religion” has generally 
focused on the freedom of the Church—the idea that the Church 
properly possesses a degree of independence from secular control that it
needs in order to carry out its divine mandate in the world until the
parousia, when all secular rule will cease.  From at least the time of the 
conflict between Pope Gregory VII and the Holy Roman Emperor Henry
IV in the eleventh century, the Church has resisted claims of the
supremacy of the secular state.  Indeed, according to George Weigel, the
resolution of the medieval investiture controversy by the Concordat of 
Worms in 1122—according to which the Church retained ultimate
authority to appoint bishops and other ecclesiastic officials—entailed 
that the state: 
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[W]ould not be all in all. . . .  Indeed, the state had to acknowledge that there 
were some things it couldn’t do because it was simply incompetent to do 
them—and that acknowledgment of limited competence created the social and
cultural conditions for the possibility of what a later generation of constitutions 
and democrats called the limited state.78 
Of course, the American Constitution owes much to the Protestant
Reformation and the subsequent secularizing Age of Enlightenment of 
the eighteenth century.  Nonetheless, it is possible to read the First
Amendment’s religion clauses as proclaiming (1) a principle of the
relative autonomy and independence from secular control of the various
ecclesial communities—churches, in the plural and the Lockean sense— 
as well as (2) a principle of government neutrality—indifferentism— 
with respect to these religious institutions. 
Although an institutional, rather than individualist, interpretation of
the religion clauses encounters obstacles of both history and late 
twentieth-century jurisprudence, it does have what seem to me to be 
some advantages.  As I have already indicated, a case can be made that
the development of religion clause jurisprudence over the last sixty years
or so constitutes a reductio of an individualist or subjective rights-of-
conscience approach to those religion clauses.  As we saw, the traditional, 
Thomistic conception of conscience is really just the conception of any 
particular moral judgment or assessment of practical reason by an
individual person.  As Steven D. Smith has demonstrated, although not 
with particular reference to the Thomistic conception, it is difficult to 
establish a case for political or judicial deference to conscience—in  
this general sense—as such.79 Although a religiously based—indeed, 
Protestant—notion of conscience originally grounded the First
Amendment’s religion clauses, secularizing interpretation of the clauses
in the later twentieth century, which has no doubt been grounded in the 
declension of religious belief among the country’s intellectual and
economic elites, has led to the paradoxical situation in which the religion
clauses are no longer interpreted as really pertaining to religion.  In the 
words of Smith: 
 78. GEORGE WEIGEL, THE CUBE AND THE CATHEDRAL: EUROPE, AMERICA, AND
POLITICS WITHOUT GOD 101 (2005), quoted in Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the 
Church, 4 J. CATHOLIC SOC. THOUGHT 59, 60 (2007). 
79. See Steven D. Smith, The Tenuous Case for Conscience, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 325 (2005). 
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The modern discourse of conscience thus presents a puzzle.  Generalizing, we 
might say that over the centuries since Thomas More and Roger Williams 
solemnly invoked conscience, the then prevailing metaethical objectivism [or, at 
least, a religiously based metaethical objectivism] has come to be highly
contested, at least in the more reflective sectors of our society, and at least in 
some neighborhoods has been to a significant extent displaced by varieties of
conventionalism, subjectivism, and (occasionally) nihilism.  At the same time, 
though, the theme of freedom of conscience has arguably become more 
widespread and commonplace—perhaps even platitudinous—in our public
rhetoric.  Thus, as the assumptions under which the case for freedom of conscience
is strongest have become embattled, the opinion favoring that freedom has, if
anything, become less and less controversial. 
What to make of this situation?  One natural inference is that the modern
invocation of freedom of conscience is partly parasitic on older ways of thinking that
many of those who invoke conscience today might find problematic.  Another
speculation is that if we look closely at the modern invocations of conscience, 
we will find uncertainty, confusion, and perhaps even a kind of degradation.80 
Smith’s diagnosis is, in my view, accurate.  As I have already mentioned,
one option is simply to live with the “uncertainty, confusion, perhaps 
even a kind of degradation”—even in our First Amendment jurisprudence 
—relying on a case-by-case appeal, as I put it above, “to some 
combination of common sense, judgment of the contemporary Zeitgeist, 
and precedent.”  Another approach is, in effect, to curtail the First
Amendment’s religion clauses, especially the Free Exercise Clause, as
sources of individual rights.  One variant of this view has been advanced 
by my former colleague James W. Nickel, who has argued that commitment 
to some distinctively religious conception of freedom is not needed if 
other “basic liberties” are guaranteed: “[o]nce we have all of the basic
liberties, religious belief and activity are an application area whose
content is adequately covered by more general rights and liberties.”81 
Somewhat similarly, our fellow symposiast Brian Leiter has concluded: 
[T]here is no principled reason for legal or constitutional regimes to single out
religion for protection; there is no moral or epistemic consideration that favors 
special legal solicitude towards beliefs that conjoin categorical commands with
insulation from evidence [Leiter’s characterization—obviously controversial—
of a set of beliefs of which “religious beliefs” is a proper subset].  Second, the 
general principled arguments for toleration noted earlier, both the broadly
Rawlsian and Millian ones, do justify legal protection for liberty of conscience,
which would necessarily encompass toleration of religious beliefs.  Third, and
perhaps most controversially, the general reasons for being skeptical that there
are special reasons to tolerate religion qua religion (because of the special
potential for harm that attaches to the conjunction of categorical demands based
80. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). 
81. James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941, 
942 (2005). 
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on beliefs insulated from evidence) suggest that we must be especially alert to
the limits of religious toleration imposed by the side-constraints.82 
Leiter concludes his extended analysis with the appealing pragmatic 
suggestion that “[i]t may turn out there is no principled reason to tolerate 
religion qua religion, but there may still be compelling practical reasons
to think the alternatives are worse.”83 
Still along somewhat similar lines, Christopher L. Eisgruber and
Lawrence G. Sager propose to substitute, in our understanding of religion in
politics and jurisprudence, the concept of “Equal Liberty” for the metaphor
of “separation of church and state.”84  They see 
concerns of fairness as lying at the very heart of free exercise exemption controversies. 
What is critical from the vantage of Equal Liberty is that no members of our
political community be disadvantaged in the pursuit of their important
commitments and projects on account of the spiritual foundations of those 
commitments and projects.85 
The “underlying concern” of equal liberty, with its insistence “on equal 
status for people with diverse spiritual views,”86 fits nicely with concepts 
of justice deriving from contemporary liberal political theory.  Eisgruber 
and Sager’s concern is with distributive justice, which—to revert to 
Aristotle’s characterization—involves a proportional or geometrical notion
of equality, rather than an arithmetical one.  That is, in retaining or enjoining 
certain free exercise exemptions, equal liberty will not necessarily 
attempt to achieve its goal of according all citizens “equal regard”87 by
advocating that, if one citizen is to receive a free exercise exemption,
each and every citizen must be accorded the same exemption. 
As Thomas Hobbes long ago noted, the concept of distributive justice 
as proportional equality “is busied about the dignity and merits of 
men.”88  In the absence of a principle of applying laws or policy in exactly
the same way to all citizens, such as Aristotle’s arithmetical equality, in 
 82. Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 26 (2008). 
83. Id. at 27. 
 84. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 4–5 (2007). 
85. Id. at 15. 
86. Id. at 19. 
87. Id. at 13. 
 88. THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN 139 (Bernard Gert ed., Hackett Publ’g 
Co. 1991) (1642). 
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what sense does a legal system that has the following effects treat all the 
relevant persons equally? 
(1) On the basis of the Free Exercise Clause, it grants an exemption 
that excuses a Roman Catholic priest—but not any other sort
of clergyman or a psychiatrist or psychological counselor— 
from a judicial obligation to reveal information imparted to
him under the seal of confession. 
(2) On a different basis, it grants an exemption that excuses a
wife from testifying against her husband and vice versa—but 
does not extend similar immunity to unwed domestic partners
or to all other family members. 
 (3) It does not grant any such exemption from any legal obligation 
of a person to supply incriminating information confidentially
imparted to him by a close friend to whom the person in
question has made a promise of confidentiality.
It is far from obvious what the relevant idea of equal treatment might
be in these cases.  In the first case, is it supposed to devolve from the
following, quite questionable line of reasoning?  There is a special
burden that the seal of confession places on a priest, a burden not shared
by a Protestant clergyman, a professional counselor, or a layperson, and 
the priest is entitled as a matter of “compensation” for bearing this
burden—as a matter of proportional equality—to receive a special judicial 
exemption. 
To consider another case, Eisgruber and Sager contend that “obviously, 
Equal Liberty entails that if [the city of] Richmond accommodates a 
secularly motivated Ms. Campbell [who wishes to set up a soup kitchen 
to feed the homeless at her residence in a area where zoning ordinances
restrict business activity], then it is constitutionally obliged to accommodate 
her religiously motivated neighbor, too”89—and vice versa.  But what of 
a third woman resident in the same neighborhood whose family’s
poverty could be relieved by her opening a tearoom in her home but 
whose personal circumstances prevent her from engaging in such an 
enterprise in a properly zoned area?  In a society characterized by ethical 
and religious pluralism of the sort emphasized by Eisgruber and Sager, it
would seem difficult to achieve agreement concerning relevant criteria— 
issues of merit or desert, in Hobbes’s language—for achieving the 
proportional equality at the heart of the notion of equal liberty.
 89. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 84, at 13. 
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Such considerations may lead to a measure of sympathy with the
majority decision of Justice Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith.90 
Alfred Smith and Galen Black, members of the Native American Church, 
had been dismissed from employment in a drug rehabilitation clinic 
because of their ingestion of peyote as part of the ritual of their church.91 
They were denied unemployment compensation by the State of Oregon 
because their dismissal had been for misconduct.92  The Oregon Court of
Appeals held that denying them unemployment benefits for their religious
use of peyote violated their free exercise First Amendment rights.93  The
State of Oregon appealed another ruling of the Oregon Supreme Court 
favorable to Smith and Black to the U.S. Supreme Court, which returned
the case to Oregon courts to determine whether the sacramental use of
peyote violated Oregon’s state drug laws.94  The Oregon Supreme Court
found that this use did indeed violate Oregon state law but also found
that this feature of state law violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause.95  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Oregon 
Supreme Court.96  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia asserted that
“[w]e have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him 
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that 
the State is free to regulate.”97  In Justice Scalia’s opinion: 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause 
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech
and of the press.98 
Justice Scalia appears to be well disposed to the policy of some states of 
making an “exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use.”99 
“But,” he continues: 
90. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
91. See id. at 874. 
92. See id. at 875. 
93. Id.
94. See id. at 875–76. 
95. See id. at 876. 
96. Id. at 890. 
97. Id. at 878–79. 
98. Id. at 881. 
99. Id. at 890. 
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to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or
even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that
the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.  It may 
fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred
to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs.100 
As Kent Greenawalt has noted, Justice Scalia qualified his opinion in
two ways, “[l]argely to accommodate precedents that flew in the face of 
his general approach.”101  I have already alluded to one qualification above:
cases that involve the “Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections.”102 Justice Scalia apparently is willing to allow
such “hybrid” accommodations.  In his trenchant criticism of the “hybrid 
analysis,” Greenawalt points out: 
[I]f free exercise claims are to carry genuine weight in hybrid cases when someone
challenging a law relies on two claims, judges will presumably have to evaluate
the strength of the free exercise claims in just the manner to which Justice Scalia
objects when free exercise claims stand alone.  All these problems suggest that the
Court probably does not regard this second sort of hybrid situation seriously; 
rather the concept is jerry-built to cover the Amish decision.103 
From a purely theoretical perspective, it would certainly be much 
neater to push what Greenawalt has termed Justice Scalia’s “general
approach” in Smith towards the reductive-eliminative theory of Nickel, 
according to which any valid free exercise claims must be cashed out in 
terms of other constitutional values.  Of course, Justice Scalia does not 
want simply to ignore stare decisis—or the actual presence of the First
Amendment’s religion clauses in addition to other enumerated rights
with their underlying constitutional values in the Bill of Rights.  And 
there is a well-established tradition in common law for recognizing 
certain free exercise exemptions, such as conscientious objection to 
military service and the seal-of-confession privilege from having to give 
sworn testimony.  Nonetheless, the Smith decision places in sharp contrast
100. Id.
 101. GREENAWALT, supra note 77, at 80. 
102. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
103. GREENAWALT, supra note 77, at 80–81.  The reference is to Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
which invalidated compulsory school attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who
refused, on religious grounds, to send their children to school.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).  Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith interprets this decision as 
involving a hybrid of free exercise rights and parental rights or, in the actual words of 
Yoder, “the interests of parenthood.”  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 n.1 (quoting Yoder, 406 
U.S. at 233). 
1100
WHITE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/29/2010 11:56 AM      
   


















   
 
  











[VOL. 47:  1075, 2010] First Amendment’s Religion Clauses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
two different theoretical approaches to the equal treatment enjoined by
an individual-conscience interpretation of the First Amendment’s religion
clauses.  One can attempt to balance, judicially, considerations of the
common good or public welfare with “serious”—but not necessarily
religiously based—claims of conscience on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis
for all laws and all conscientiously held beliefs, to paraphrase Justice
Scalia, in an attempt to achieve some semblance of Aristotelian
“proportional equality.”  Or one can, much more simply but also much
more severely, aim for “arithmetic equality” by maintaining that “equal
treatment” is best achieved by forbidding any free exercise exemptions
to any “otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.”104  The latter approach would largely limit legitimate free 
exercise claims to those based on the infringement of the right to engage
private or public worship, in a fairly restricted sense of “worship.” 
Finding a principled via media between these two extremes in terms of
an individual-conscience-based interpretation of the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses has proved difficult.  Perhaps an institutional-privilege-
based interpretation could fare somewhat better.  For some years now,
Frederick Schauer has been an advocate for a more institutionally sensitive
approach to First Amendment rights, such as freedom of speech.  Of 
course, institutionally relevant distinctions such as that between
ideological advocacy and commercial advertisement have already found
their way into constitutional jurisprudence.  But Schauer suggests that a 
more “institutional First Amendment would thus move the inquiry away 
from direct application of the underlying values of the First Amendment 
to the conduct at issue and towards the mediating determination of 
whether the conduct at issue was or was not the conduct of one of these 
institutions.”105  He imagines
a First Amendment that less grudgingly accepted colleges and universities as
appropriate areas for highly (externally) unregulated inquiry, and thus as
domains in which the array of privileges in the strict sense—academic freedom
as a genuine immunity from certain laws of general application—was constitutionally
guaranteed.  Much the same might be said about libraries . . . . Similar
arguments could support an analogous privilege for scientific research, even
that scientific research that does not have a home within a university.  For all
these institutions, the argument would be that the virtues of special autonomy—
104. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. 
 105. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256, 1274 (2005). 
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special immunity from regulation—would in the large serve important purposes
of inquiry and knowledge acquisition, and that those purposes are not only
socially valuable, but also have their natural (or at least most comfortable) home
within the boundaries of the First Amendment.106 
With respect to a more institutional approach to the First Amendment,
Schauer notes: 
Obviously, defining the category of people who receive the privilege will be
based both on the reasons for having the privilege and the reasons for locating it
in a particular institution, but the case-by-case inquiry will largely consist of 
applying the rule, rather than applying the reasons lying behind the rule directly
to individual cases.107 
More recently, Richard W. Garnett and others have contemplated
extending an institutional-privilege type of analysis to the First
Amendment’s religion clauses.  This sort of analysis is, I believe, in its
early stages, and I shall not attempt to deal with its details. Its 
fundamental idea, however, is that, just as universities, libraries, or news 
media might receive certain First Amendment protections or privileges
that would extend to their representatives or members, so also might 
“churches”—what I have termed ecclesial communities.  Rather than 
attempting to explore details concerning which I do not have particular 
competence, I conclude this essay with several comments concerning 
potential points of controversy that would appear to attach to this
approach to the First Amendment’s religion clauses. 
(1) The institutional-privilege analysis makes it more difficult to
engage in an eliminative-reductive approach to the presence of religion 
in the Constitution.  The tendency of much contemporary constitutional 
jurisprudence, as I have previously noted, has been to attempt to remove
“religion as such” from the First Amendment—by interpreting the Free 
Exercise Clause as pertaining to subjective, individual matters of conscience 
that need not be religiously grounded.  The present analysis would
forthrightly admit that religion, as represented by ecclesial communities, 
constitutes a social, moral, and legal category of continuing significance in
American life.  This analysis would, in fact, coincide more closely with 
the traditional Catholic conceptualization of issues of religious freedom
as issues pertaining to the freedom of the Church.  The obvious difference 
would be that the religion clauses would be understood, in the case of Free
Exercise Clause, to guarantee the freedom of all legitimate ecclesial 
communities while, in the case of the Establishment Clause, to guarantee
governmental impartiality with respect to these communities.  The fact
106. Id. at 1274–75. 
107. Id. at 1275. 
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that the Constitution accords a special place to religion has seemed
evident, at least prior to the eliminative-reductive jurisprudence of the
last half century or so.  The justification of the special treatment accorded 
by the Constitution to religion is another issue—an issue that perhaps 
might be better kept separate by the institutional-privilege approach to 
the religion clauses.108 
Justification of religion’s place in the public square—and, indeed, the 
issue of what that place should be—is likely to remain controversial
matters for the foreseeable future.  There is, of course, no lack of secular
arguments drawn from history for according privileges to ecclesial
communities.  For example, it can be argued that such communities 
serve as a buffer between the desire of individual citizens for maximal 
freedom, on the one hand, and the tendency of the state to assert its
hegemony with respect to all aspects of the lives of its citizens, on the
other hand.  Another very common argument, extending back to antiquity,
is that ecclesial communities can serve the state by buttressing the moral
scruples of citizens that are conducive to secular welfare.  Although they
are not without force, I believe that such secular, religiously neutral 
arguments probably are not conclusive.  However, a more important point is
that from the perspective of many persons—at least, many religious 
persons—they are not very important; they do not get at the real importance
of faith or religious practice.  From my own perspective and, I think, that
of many other persons, a liberal neutral justification for the state’s
recognition of certain privileges and obligations distinctive to ecclesial
communities is not necessary, nor in all likelihood possible.  However, it 
is undeniable that some persons believe that special constitutional
recognition of “religion as such” is problematic or that, at least, such 
108. I certainly recognize that the problem, in contemporary First Amendment
jurisprudence, of determining what constitutes a legitimate issue of conscience that should be
accorded accommodation would be paralleled, in a more institutionally oriented approach, to
determining what constitutes a legitimate ecclesial community or church.  My own inclination 
is to think that the latter issue should be approached partly from an historical perspective.  
Limiting whatever privileges that are granted under the religion clauses to members of
communities with established history of such-and-such years would eliminate ad hoc
formation of communities for the exclusive or primary purpose of obtaining for its members 
such an accommodation.  Although it might be argued that such a policy would initially
discriminate against new ecclesial communities, this fact does not seem to me to be an 
overwhelmingly important objection. I have also purposely left open the issue of whether, or
to what degree and how, any accommodations accorded to ecclesial communities under the
institutional approach could properly be trumped by a compelling state interest. 
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recognition would require some sort of neutral justification that should,
in principle, be acceptable to all reasonable citizens, whether religious, 
nonreligious, or antireligious.  Such persons will naturally be skeptical 
of the institutional-privilege approach that I am considering. 
It is at least conceivable that in time religion will become of no 
importance to the vast majority of American citizens.  In such 
circumstances, there would seem to me to be a real problem about justifying 
the continuing presence of the religion clauses in the First Amendment.  In 
such imagined circumstances, any such possible justification—were it to be 
effective—would apparently need to be secular and in some sense neutral.
But I do not think that those circumstances yet obtain in fact. 
(2) The institutional-privilege analysis assumes that the Bill of Rights 
need not be restricted exclusively to the rights of individual citizens 
considered simply as such.  This issue, of course, is a complex one, 
which I shall not at present attempt to explore further than quoting the 
animadversions of Frederick Schauer: 
But it is hardly apparent that the First Amendment is centrally about individual
rights in any strong sense.  Not only does the First Amendment frequently and
properly provide protection to other-regarding and harmful acts, a surprising 
feature for a truly individual right, but a large number of the widely accepted 
justifications for freedom of speech are about the social and not individual value
of granting to individuals an instrumental right to freedom of speech.  If we
embrace the First Amendment because it promotes the values of the marketplace of
ideas as a facilitator of the search for truth, or the value of checking government 
abuses, or even the value of facilitating democratic deliberation among the 
populace, [for example,] then we perceive a right to freedom of speech that lies
not at moral bedrock, but is empirically contingent and instrumental to
something deeper.109 
I must mention that one area in which contemporary First Amendment 
jurisprudence seems to me to have developed in an extremely subjective,
individualistic direction is in decisions concerning conscience-based
exemption from military service on which I earlier focused.  It is not
obvious to me how the institutional-privilege approach could or should 
be applied to the First Amendment’s religion clauses in order to justify
all of what the modern Supreme Court has decided on this matter.  But,
to speak frankly, it seems to me that these decisions constitute a chaotic 
whole, verging on the incoherent. So I am not convinced that any rational 
approach to the religion clauses should support all of what the Court has 
decided with respect to military exemption. 
(3) The institutional-privilege analysis does not assume that the 
fundamental rationale behind the First Amendment’s religion clauses is
 109. Schauer, supra note 105, at 1268–69 (footnotes omitted). 
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the promotion of persons’ equality, according to some conception or theory
of equality.  It seems relatively uncontroversial that a consequence of the
Establishment Clause is the promotion of equality among ecclesial 
communities in the form of its forbidding the establishment of any ecclesial 
community as the “national church”—and, by extension, its prohibition 
of the government’s showing favoritism towards any such community or
group of such communities.  But liberal political theory seems to be the 
main source of the assumption that the fundamental concern of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is—or should be—the promotion 
of some conception of public stance of equality of respect toward persons’
religions, nonreligious, or antireligious serious moral convictions—or, 
what is not necessarily the same thing, their serious convictions concerning 
what is really important in life.  Indeed, we have seen that this assumption 
lies at the heart of one common contemporary conception of freedom of
conscience.  Whether such a public stance is in itself a good thing is open to
debate.  But, even if it is, it does not seem to me to be necessary—or, for 
that matter, prudent—to adopt an interpretation of the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses according to which it is freedom of conscience, in this
sense, that they seek to promote.  Even if one believes that some conception
of the equality of citizens is the most fundamental of constitutional values,
there are surely other such values, and not everything in the Constitution 
need be interpreted in terms of that one particular fundamental value. 
V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, I certainly recognize that the institutional-accommodation 
approach to the First Amendment’s religion clauses is unlikely to be
equally attractive to all persons, irrespective of their legal, political, or 
religious commitments.  Nor is this approach inconsistent with the
doctrine that it is in some cases morally permissible—or even morally 
obligatory—to accommodate individual consciences, whose scruples are
not necessarily religious, with respect to statutes or governmental 
policies to which they object.  However, if such statutes or policies are 
truly immoral, allowing or mandating exemptions based on the Free
Exercise Clause is surely not the optimal legal or political means for 
dealing with the problem.  Nor, I think, is it the optimal means in the
case of statutes or policies the morality or wisdom of which are 
contested on the basis of considerations that are not clearly religious in 
the commonly accepted sense of that term.
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